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Land Development and Pigouvian Taxes:
The Case of Peatland
Renan u. Goetz
In this paper the determination of an optimal Pigouvian tax for a competitive firm
when a negative production externality is present concurrent with the development of
land for production purposes is analyzed within a dynamic framework. Conditions are
established for a convex social net return function where a Pigouvian tax is not
required or where the imposition of a Pigouvian tax leads to the decision not to
develop the land at all. In the case of a concave social net return function the
Pigouvian tax is either a linear or a nonlinear tax on the private net returns.
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Pigouvian taxes can be considered as a first-
best. environmental policy to achieve the so-
cially desired ends if it is possible to mea-
sure the costs and benefits associated with
the externality (Cropper and Oates). Apart
from the question of whether or not
Pigouvian taxes can be applied in reality,
other issues related to Pigouvian taxes have
been raised. Spulber analyzed the long-run
efficiency properties of Pigouvian taxes and
established an entry-exit condition for a
long-run equilibrium that must be satisfied
for an efficient outcome. Lee and Barnett
proposed a second-best Pigouvian tax in
light of imperfect competition in the pres-
ence of negative externalities. Baumol and
Bradford showed that detrimental externali-
ties tend to induce nonconvexity of the social
production possibility set even if individual
producers face a convex production possibil-
ity set. As a result, there may exist a multi-
plicity of local maxima, leaving the determi-
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nation of the global social maximum open. A
similar result was obtained by Starrett where
the failure of the second-order conditions
arise from the nonconcavity of the function
representing the firm's production function
as it is affected by a negative externality.
In this paper the development' of peatland for
agricultural production where empirical evi-
dence shows that the traditional assumption of
strong concavity of the producer's net return
function might not hold is characterized. In pre-
vious papers, the assumption of concavity is
violated because producers of different goods
are negatively affected by each other. By con-
trast, in this paper the nonconcavity of the net
return function results from the opportunity of
the producer to switch to production of more
valuable goods through developing more of the
essential and limiting factor, land quality. For
the case of a convex social net return function,
the optimal private and social outcome may be
identically given by an upper boundary solu-
tion, and no Pigouvian tax is required. How-
ever, a Pigouvian tax may lead to the farmer's
decision not to develop the land at all.
If the social and the private net return func-
tions are concave, a linear Pigouvian tax on the
private net return function induces the farmer to
achieve the optimal social outcome. However,
if the private net return function is convex, a
nonlinear Pigouvian tax on the farmer's net re-
turns is required to generate the optimal social
outcome.
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Figure 1. Cross section of drained peatland
I In Finland and Sweden, for instance, 33.5% and 15.6% of the
entire land respectively is covered with peat (Pfadenhauer et al.).
drained up to 75 em, the farmer optimally can
grow corn and various small grains, while
draining the peatland to a depth of up to 100
em enables the farmer optimally to grow veg-
etables (Poiree and Ollier, Maslov and Panov).
The subsidence of peatland located in central
western Europe from these farming practices
ranges between 1-4 em per year. The associated
net return function 1t(g), is a monotonically in-
creasing function in g with 1t(0) =O. The lower
the groundwater level, chosen by the farmer,
the more valuable the crops that can be grown
at the expense of high subsidence rates of the
soil. Depletion of the peat stock, however, re-
duces the future profitability of the land, and
thus the farmer faces a trade-off between high
immediate net returns for a shorter period of
time versus lower net returns for a longer pe-
riod of time.
As a case study for a particular area, the
choice of the optimal intertemporal groundwa-
ter level for a net-return-maximizing farmer has
been analyzed by Goetz and Zilberman. How-
ever, they did not consider the potential pollu-
tion of the groundwater and surface water with
nitrogen (N) in the form of nitrate as a result of
the mineralization of the organic material. In
Germany, where nearly the entire fen peatland
is utilized for agricultural production (Gottlich
and Kuntze), or in states or countries like Min-
nesota, Canada, or North Europe where large
peatlands can be found, mineralization of the
organic material is likely to affect the
groundwater or surface water quality.' More-
over, peatland often serves as a habitat for en-
An Economic Model for the Development of
Peatland
The origin of peatland (organic soil) and its
special properties in comparison with mineral
soil have been described in detail by Goetz and
Zilberman. They also described the key charac-
teristics of the agricultural utilization of
peatland, so we will be relatively brief with re-
spect to these issues.
Under specific climatic and hydrologic con-
ditions, plant residue does not completely
decompose, which gives rise to the growth and
deposit of peat. Peat is characterized by a high
content of organic material and nutrients, and
thus peatland is particularly interesting for agri-
culture. For example, peat contains on average
more than 2.5% of nitrogen in the dry matter
compared to 0.03%-0.3% for mineral soil
(Kuntze, Roeschmann, and Schwerdtfeger).
Growing crops on peatland requires developing
the land beforehand by installing a drainage
system. Inevitably, this will lead to the subsid-
ence of the land due to an initial loss of volume
and to a nearly constant rate of mineralization
of the organic material (Schothorst). Segeberg
has shown that the subsidence is directly pro-
portional to the groundwater level and can be
mathematically expressed as
(1) s = -[f(t) + y]g(t)
where a dot over a variable denotes the opera-
tor dldt and t time. The variable s(t) represents
the distance between the topsoil level and the
drainage tubes (peat stock) (i.e., the amount of
soil developed), j the subsidence of the
peatland, f(t) an exponential distribution of
time, y > 0 the constant mineralization rate, and
g(t) the distance between the topsoil level and
the groundwater level. For a graphical illustra-
tion of the points of reference to measure the
variables s(t) and g(t), see figure 1. To simplify
notation, the argument t of s, f, g and z, A, <1>;, i
= 1, 2, 3 (to be introduced later), will be sup-
pressed unless it is necessary for an unambigu-
ous notation.
Different crops require for their optimal
growth particular groundwater levels which can
be set by the farmer by means of controlled
drainage, either in the form of subirrigation or
irrigation. Hence, the groundwater level deter-
mines the kind of crops that can be grown. A
groundwater level of approximately 50 em is
optimal for growing grass. If the peatland is
t
g(t)
o
groundwater level
drainage tubes
top-soil level
r
s(t)
o
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dangered species of plants (Briemle). There-
fore, its value as an environmental asset should
be compared with the social benefits from the
agricultural utilization of the peatland. Conse-
quently, providing a benchmark for the decision
as to whether (a) to continue agricultural pro-
duction on peatland or to restore its natural state
by raising the groundwater level to the top soil
level; or (b) to convert intact peatland into pro-
ductive agricultural land or to conserve it, should
include negative production externalities.
The N-mineralization for peat ranges from
300 to 1,200 kg N per hectare (ha) per em peat
loss. Even perennial crops like grassland are
only able to assimilate 500 kg/ha of N per year.
Although some of the mineralized N is biologi-
cally denitrified and lost as gas in the form of
NzO (Guthrie and Duxburg), a high share of the
mineralized N is expected to leach into the
groundwater or run into surface waters. Kuntze
measured the N content of the groundwater re-
charge per hectare cultivated with agricultural
crops. He found that the admissible 11.0 kg N/
ha per 100 mm groundwater recharge for meet-
ing N03 regulations for drinking water in the
European Community was not satisfied, reach-
ing concentration levels up to six times above
the standard.
Equation (1) shows that the groundwater
level is proportional to the subsidence of the
soil, and consequently as well to the release of
nitrogen, denoted by z. Moreover, the release of
nitrogen is monotonically increasing with g. As
such, there exists a functional relationship ~z =
g, ~ > 0 and equation (1) and the net return
function can be written as
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II
(P) ~,~xJe-ol<p(z)dt
o
subject to
s =-if + y)~Z, s(O)So,
Z E Z " {Z : Z = 0; a " Z s b; Z s *}
where () > 0 presents the social discount rate,
and t I denotes the end of the planning horizon.
The maximum life span of the installed drain-
age system is given by T and places an upper
bound on t); therefore t) E [0, n. As stated
above, peatland can be utilized for agricultural
production when g is between 50 and 100 em,
which corresponds to the values a and b for the
control variable z. Moreover, as a physical ne-
cessity, g must always be smaller than s, which
yields the constraint S - ~z ~ O. The current
value Hamiltonian is therefore given by H =
1t(~z) - e(z) - A(f + y)~z, where A denotes the
costate variable. Taking account of the con-
straints on the control variable z, we obtain the
following Lagrangian: L = H + <p)(z - a) + <Pz(b
- z) + <pls - ~z) where <Pi' i = 1, 2, 3, represents
the Lagrange multipliers. A solution for prob-
lem (P) has to satisfy the following necessary
conditions which are stated in accordance with
propositions 2.5 and 6.1 of Feichtinger and
Hartl:
(2) s = -if + y)~z, 1t(~z).
(5) s =-if + y)~z, s(O) = So
where the subscript with respect to a variable
denotes the corresponding partial derivative.
Moreover, the optimal values of the control
variable z and the Lagrange multipliers have to
satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: L$i ~ 0, <Pi
~ 0 and <Pi L$i = 0, for i = 1, 2, 3. The constraint
qualification will be satisfied due to the linear-
ity of the restrictions in z (Takayama). The
transversality conditions are given by
In the presence of a negative production exter-
nality given by the pollution of the groundwater
and surface water, the costs and benefits of
abating nitrate need to be considered. Hence, to
ensure efficiency we assume that a social plan-
ner exists, and thus the social net return func-
tion is given by <p(z) = 1t(~z) - [k(z) + d(z)],
where k(z) denotes the costs and d(z) the ben-
efits of abating the negative production exter-
nality. In line with the literature, it is proposed
that k + d is convex (see, for example, Baumol
and Oates and Pearce). To simplify the notation
we set k(z) + d(z) = e(z) and refer to e as social
costs.
Now, we are able to state the optimal control
problem for the social planner:
(6) (
t ) > TJfor
t) = T
Note that q>(a) = <p(a) and q>(b) = <p(b); other-
wise <p > q>. Next, we will replace q> in problem
(P) with <p a'ld denote this problem by (P). The
linearity of (P) in z suggests the definition of a
switching function, a, given by
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(7) A(t\) ~ 0
S(t\) - ~a ~ 0
A(t\)[S(t\) - ~a] =0
where complementary slackness applies to the
last expression, and the superscript * indicates
the evaluation along the optimal path. The eco-
nomic interpretation of the necessary condi-
tions is deferred to a later section where we
analyze the optimal trajectories of sand z to-
gether with the different qualitative properties
of the social net return function.
(8)
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<p = [n(~a) - c( a)]b - [n(~b) - c( b)]a
b-a
+ {n(~b) - c(b) - [n(~a) - c(a)]}z.
b-a
Plgouvlan Taxes
Based on Swiss data, Goetz and Zilberman
showed that neg) is strictly convex and that it is
optimal for the individual farmer to drain the
land to the upper limit and to deplete the soil as
fast as possible over the entire time horizon. In
this paper we will not restrict ourselves to this
particular example. More importantly, taking
account of the social costs of the negative pro-
duction externality in the form of groundwater
or surface water pollution may alter the qualita-
ti ve properties of the problem (P). Even if
n(~z) is strictly convex in z. the function q>(z)
can either be convex or concave in z, depending
on whether n(~z) or c(z) has the stronger curva-
ture. To analyze the implications of these quali-
tative properties on the trajectories of s* and
z*, we will first discuss the case where q> is
convex, and thereafter where q> is concave.
The Social Net Return Function is Convex
The qualitative properties of the optimal trajecto-
ries can be obtained by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. If the social net return func-
tion, given in problem (P), is strictly convex in
z, the optimal trajectory of z is a boundary so-
lution.'
Proof. The idea is to reduce the convex prob-
lem to that of a linear one by the construction
of a linear function <p whose graph lies above
that of q>. This function is given by
2 For the case where cp is convex, the function can be partitioned
such that cp is strictly convex or linear on intervals of z. On these
intervals, cp can be analyzed in the same way as described in
proposition 1.
(9) a(t) = Hz
n(~b) - c(b) - [n(~a) - c(a)]
= b _ a - A(f + I')~.
As is known flom the theory of optimal control,
maximizing H requires the following choices:
(10) z = [z : • :~:~: ~].
a , aCt) < 0
If a singular path, a = 0, occurs for some posi-
tive interval of time, then the optimal trajectory
of z can also lie in the interior of Z. Let us as-
sume that a singular path exists. Hence, for
som~ positive interval of time, cr = -'A if + I')~
- Af~ = 0 has to hold, which yields
'A j
-=---
A f + I'
Utilizing equation (4) for an interior value of Z
results in
(11) j =-'O(f + 1').
The general solution of this differential equa-
tion is fit) = c\e-& - 1', where c\ is a constant.
However, substitutingf(t) in equation (2) shows
that 1', the constant of mineralization, cancels
out, changing the qualitative properties of ex-
pression (2). Thus, we can conclude that c\e St -
I' is not an admissible solution and no singular
path for any z in the interior of Z exists. Hence
z* takes on a boundary value.
So far, we obtained",qualitative properties of
z* for the problem (P). However, since q> of
Goetz
problem (P) is strictly convex in z. the subsid-
ence of peatland is linear in z, and the switch-
ing function orr) associated with problem (P)
does not vanish over a time interval of positive
length, theorem 3.3 of Feichtinger and Hartl
can be employed. This theorem suggests that
the replacement of cp by cP in problem (P)
yields the same optimal values for s", z', A*,
where z* is given by 0, a, b, or slJ3. More pre-
cisely,
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vate net return function. We know further that 1t
is monotonically increasing, and thus proposi-
tion 1 suggests that the optimal private trajec-
tory of z is chosen from the upper boundary of
the set Z.3 However, the convexity of cp does
not determine the sign of cp', which in turn
leaves the determination of the optimal value of
z open. Let us first consider the case where cp' > 0
(12) z' = argmax{max[H(O. A. t), tu». A. t), H(b, A, t), H(i-. A. t)]}
3 This result can be obtained even though proposition I requires
strict convexity. As indicated in footnote 2 an appropriate partition
of the private net return function enables us to apply proposition I
for the different segments of the partition. In the case where the
segment is strictly convex, proposition I can be applied directly. If
the segment is linear, then a boundary solution also can be estab-
lished by the fact that the switching function does not vanish over
a positive interval of time.
for cp > 0, and the socially and privately optimal
trajectories are identically given by an upper
boundary value of Z. In this case, there is no need
to correct the market outcome because it is also
optimal from the social point of view. However,
if cp' = 1t' - c' < 0 for cp > 0, say for t > t, then
the privately and socially optimal outcomes are
distinct, and the market outcome needs to be
corrected such that the farmer chooses a. For
the case cp < 0, it would be socially optimal not
to drain the land at all. Thus, a tax
would induce the optimal social outcome where
z; refers to the optimal private outcome.
Hence, at point t the farmer would either
switch to z =a or to z =O. However, regardless
of the optimal social outcome beyond time t,
the farmer may choose not to develop the land
at all since the investment in the drainage sys-
tem may no longer be profitable when 't is in-
corporated in a cost benefit analysis.
For the calculation of the tax 't the function
c(z) needs to be known over the interval [a, b].
When this function is not available, an upper
bound to social costs can be obtained provided
that information exists supporting the convexity
where the variables s and A of the right-hand
side of equation (12) have to be evaluated for
the given boundary value of z.
In other words, in the case of a strictly con-
vex social net return function, with respect to
agricultural production, it may be optimal to
drain the land as deeply as possible or as shal-
low as possible, or not at all. If t, < T and none
of the Hamiltonians evaluated at H(a, A, t,),
H(b, A, t,), H[(s/~), A, t,] is zero, then the
transversality condition (6) requires that we
choose z(t,) = 0 at the terminal point of time.
Thus, the peatland will be utilized for agricul-
tural production as long as H(a, A, t), H(b, A, t)
and H[(s/~) A, t] are strictly positive. If this
condition fails to be satisfied over time, the uti-
lization of the peatland for agricultural pur-
poses would be terminated and the groundwater
level would be raised to the topsoil level. Simi-
larly, if t, = T and H(a, A, t,), H(b, A, t,), and
H[(s/~) A, td are strictly negative, then z(t,) =0
also has to be chosen to satisfy equation (6).
However, if H(a, A, t), H(b, A, t), and H[(s/~) A,
t] ~ 0, for all t, then z*(t,) ~ O. For this case, it
may be optimal to leave the minimum layer of
peat or even more in the ground.
Social versus private outcome for the convex
case. Next, we will analyze the conditions for
an optimal social outcome, which is distinct
from an optimal private outcome, and requires
a regulator to correct the market outcome. Note
that the case of a convex social net return func-
tion implies that the private net return function,
1t, is also convex. Otherwise, the social net re-
turn function as a sum of two concave func-
tions, 1t(~z) and -c(z), would also be concave.
Moreover, the convexity of cp also requires that
cp" ~ c", The case of a linear social cost func-
tion, for example, would give rise to a convex
social net return function, given a convex pri-
(13) {
0 .
't(t) = '
c(z;);
t ~ ~}
t > t
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of the function over the interval [a, b], and the
points c(a) and c(b) are known. A linearization
of c(z), denoted by v(z), is given by
(14) c(a)b - c(b)a (C(b) - c(a)]v(z) = + z
b-a b-a
negligence of the social costs, the optimal pri-
vate strategy reaches the boundary before the
optimal social strategy."
To analyze the possibilities for a regulator to
correct the market outcome, we introduce an ad
valorem tax t. Thus, the necessary condition
for the solution of the farmer's problem yields
where v(z) > c(z) for z E (a, b), and v(a) = c(a)
and v(b) = c(b). Replacing c(z) with v(z) in
problem (P) and solving for the optimal trajec-
tory of z yields a boundary solution. If the con-
sideration of the negative production external-
ity has no effect on the optimal private out-
come, no Pigouvian tax needs to be imposed.
Hence, the upper bound of the social cost
serves as a benchmark to decide whether or not
the market outcome needs to be corrected at all.
The Social Net Return Function is Concave
In contrast to the previous section we look now
at optimal solutions lying in the interior or at
the boundary of Z. The transversality condition
(7) for the case of an interior solution shows
that ACtI) = 0, given s(t l ) - ~a > O. Next, solv-
ing equation (4) yields A(t) = Aje-°r, where A j ~ 0
is determined by the condition A(t j ) =O. How-
ever, this implies that ACt) =0, contradicting the
dynamic properties of problem (P). Hence, we
can conclude that an interior solution over the
entire time interval [to, t l ] is not possible be-
cause the requirement s(t j) = ~a = ~z*(tj) can-
not be satisfied. At least at the terminal point in
time, z takes on a boundary value.
(17) (1 - "t)1t'(~z)~ - 'A(f + y)~ - <l>3~ = 0
A(t + y) + <1>3~ "t(z) = 1 - -----
1t'(~z)
where we consider the example of a boundary
solution for set) = ~z. If the regulator sets the
tax equal to "t( z;), then z;, the solution to the
necessary condition of the social problem given
in equation (16), also solves the necessary con-
dition of the private problem, given in equation
(17). In other words, the individual farmer
chooses the groundwater level which is identi-
cal with the socially optimal groundwater level.
In this way, the optimal private and social strat-
egies will reach the boundary at the same time,
and no tax is required for the time thereafter.
If n, however, is convex, any linear tax "t on
the private net return will not alter the curva-
ture of 1t, and the private outcome is always
given by a boundary solution. To obtain a pri-
vate strategy which lies in the interior of Z and
is identical with the social strategy, a nonlinear
tax on private net returns is required. We pro-
pose three different tax schemes, where the first
one, in the form of a step function, is the limit-
ing case of the second one. Consider the fol-
lowing tax:
4 The proof can be obtained from the author upon request.
For any upper deviation from the socially opti-
mal water pollution level the tax is prohibitive,
but it is equal to zero for any lower deviation
from the optimal social strategy. While this tax
is easy to administer, it is most likely not politi-
cally feasible since it basically places a cap on
the farmer's net returns. A tax which is continu-
ously increasing but starting out low for small
upper deviations may be politically easier to in-
troduce. For the derivation of this tax, math-
ematically expressed as "t[1t(~z)], consider first
Social versus private outcome for the con-
cave case. In order to compare the social out-
come with the private outcome we need to de-
fine some qualitative properties of 1t. Let us as-
sume for now that 1t,besides <p, is concave. For an
interior solution, the optimal private strategy z;
differs from that of the optimal social strategy z;
as can be seen from the necessary conditions
for an interior solution of the private and social
problem, given respectively by
(15) 1t'(~z)~ = A(f + y)~
(16) 1t'(~z)~ - c'(z) =A(f + y)~.
Moreover, we know that every optimal solution
that starts as an interior solution will tum into a
boundary solution after some time. Because of
(18) (
0 . 1t(~z)::; 1t(~z; ))."t[1t(~z)] = '
1t(~b); 1t(~z) > 1t(~z;)
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the necessary condition for an interior solution
of the private problem given by
where equation (19) was utilized. One candi-
date for the tax, satisfying equations (19) and
(20), is given by
Equation (19) has to hold at z = z;. The second-
order condition, which has to hold for any z > z;,
implies
(19) {I - 't'[1t(~z)J}1t'(~z)~ - A(f + I'O~ = 0
A(f + y)
~ 't'[1t(~z)] = 1 - .1t'(~z)
Summary
Initial or repeated land development for agri-
cultural production results in groundwater and
surface water pollution in the case of peatland.
As shown in the literature, the farmer's net re-
turn function may not be concave since farmers
switch to the production of more valuable crops
as more soil becomes available. Thus, taking
account of the additional costs from the water
pollution may result in a convex or concave so-
cial net return function. In the case where the
social net return function is convex, the pri-
vately and socially optimal outcomes may be
identical and no market correction is required.
However, if the two outcomes are distinct, a
Pigouvian tax is proposed which leads to a less
intensive use of the land or to the decision not
to develop the land at all. Even if the optimal
~"[n(J3z)1> [n"(J3z)1AU 13+ y)[1t'( Z)]3(20)
(21) {
0 3 2; 1t(~z)::; 1t(~z;)}.
't[1t(~z)] = -l [1t(~z)F - A(f + y)~z + _z- - _z_. 1t(A
Z) >2 3(Z;)2 2(z;) , .... 1t(~z;)
The tax scheme in equation (21) induces the
net-return-maximizing farmer to choose z;.
The first two taxes, as proposed in equations
(18) and (21), are not directly related to the
monetary damage from the water pollution.
Thus, they can be seen as a method to imple-
ment a certain standard. The third proposed
possibility for the regulator to correct the mar-
ket outcome is to employ the social costs c(z)
as a tax scheme. Because this tax scheme re-
flects the monetary damages accurately, it
seems to be superior to the first two tax
schemes. However, the implementation of this
tax would require information about z, which
may not be easily observable. Instead of z it
would be easier to observe the farmer's net re-
turns. Hence, we consider the invertible func-
tion y = 1t(~z). The tax can now be expressed as
a function of the farmer's net returns and is
given by
social outcome suggests the extensive use of
the land, the farmer may decide not to use the
land at all because investing in the drainage
system is no longer profitable due to the impo-
sition of a Pigouvian tax.
The case where the private as well as the so-
cial net return function are concave results in a
linear Pigouvian tax on the private net return
function. However, if the social net return func-
tion is concave while the private net return
function is convex, a linear Pigouvian tax on
the private net return function does not exist
which corrects the market outcome such that
the socially optimal outcome, given by an inte-
rior solution, is chosen by the farmer. To ac-
complish this objective, three different tax
schemes are proposed, where the tax is a non-
linear function on the private net returns.
[
1t-1 (y)]
(22) 't[1t(~z)] = c -~- .
[Received June 1995;
final revision received January 1997.]
Faced with this tax, the net-return-maximizing
farmer chooses z; that is identical to that given
by the solution to the necessary conditions for
an interior solution for the private and social
problems.
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